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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its eightieth conference
in Washington, D.C., on September 8 and 9, 2005. This issue of the Brook-
ings Papers includes the papers and discussions presented at the conference.
The ﬁrst paper examines some possible drawbacks to greater transparency
by central banks. The second analyzes the change in the income distribution
that has accompanied the productivity surge of the past decade. The third
studies how workers respond to information about risk in their retirement
accounts. The fourth looks at the long-run interactions between energy
needs and the environment. The issue concludes with a report that questions
the widespread preference for the payroll data over the household data as
a measure of monthly employment gains. 
Central bankers and economists alike have increasingly come to
believe that central bank communication and transparency are key to an
effective monetary policy. For many this belief stems from the generally
held view that long-term interest rates, which the central bank does not
directly control, are the main link between monetary policy and the spend-
ing decisions of households and ﬁrms. Expectations about the path of future
short-term rates, which the central bank does control, play a central role in
determining long-term rates, and transparency regarding the setting of
short-term rates is seen as increasing the central bank’s ability to affect
those expectations. These beliefs have led to increased openness in the con-
duct of policy. In 1994 the Federal Reserve’s main policymaking body, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), began the practice of immedi-
ately following each of its meetings with a public announcement, and the
information content of those announcements has increased steadily since
then. In the current recovery, for example, the FOMC’s postmeeting
announcements have indicated clearly the committee’s intention to raise the
federal funds rate, its principal short-term policy rate, at a measured pace
ixover a sustained period. Accompanying these announcements has been a
large increase in the number of public speeches by FOMC members, aimed
at better informing the public on how the committee makes its judgments.
Meanwhile the central banks of many countries other than the United States
have adopted explicit inflation targeting. This policy is motivated by the
same belief that the central bank should be more transparent and account-
able to the public. In the ﬁrst article of this issue, Stephen Morris and Hyun
Song Shin analyze the subtle ways in which increased transparency affects
public expectations and the information value of market signals. Although
they support the notion that clear statements both of the central bank’s view
of the economy and of its policy intentions will move expectations closer to
the bank’s own view, they argue that, paradoxically, such statements may
actually decrease the information content of market signals, to the detri-
ment of both the central bank and private agents. 
The authors begin with an extensive discussion of the importance of
informational efﬁciency to economic welfare. The efﬁcacy of decisions by
both private agents and the central bank depends on the accuracy of the
information they have available. For example, informational efficiency
plays an important role in determining the accuracy with which prices in
ﬁnancial markets reﬂect both business opportunities and resource scarcities.
For central banks the primary issue is how transparency affects the prices
relevant to the allocation of capital across time, rather than across ﬁrms or
industries at a given moment in time. The authors describe the importance
of the yield curve in affecting the duration of investment projects, the effect
of long-term rates on the housing market, and the sensitivity of investment
to stock prices. 
Efficient information is important not just for the signals it provides to
private agents, but also for the guidance it provides for the central bank’s
own decisions. The authors observe that, in order for the central bank to
steer the economy in the right direction, it must have good information on
the current state of the economy—in particular, how close the economy is
to capacity—and on its likely course in the future. This includes not just
information about asset prices in financial markets, but also information
about goods prices and the cost conditions of ﬁrms. 
An essential element in the authors’argument, not usually mentioned
in discussions of central bank transparency, is that private agents collec-
tively have a great deal of information that is relevant to efﬁcient allocation
and that, with more public information available, less of that private infor-
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1945 essay, “On the Use of Knowledge in Society,” which emphasizes the
dispersion of information among individuals and the role of market prices
in aggregating that information. For example, an individual business exec-
utive is likely to have the best estimate of the expected productivity of his
or her own various investment opportunities, but not those of other busi-
nesses. If a central planner knew the complete list of potential projects of all
businesses and their expected productivities, it would be a relatively simple
task to allocate aggregate saving among those projects. But planners do
not have that information. In Hayek’s view, prices emerging from markets
do convey that information, efficiently summarizing the shifting funda-
mentals of the economy that no individual agent can discern. Morris and
Shin see the position of the central bank as analogous to that of Hayek’s
central planner: “The central bank’s resources and expertise, as formid-
able as they are, may fail to match the collective wisdom of the economi-
cally active population as a whole.” 
If the public information provided by the central bank simply added to
the private information of agents, it would be hard to imagine it being detri-
mental to efficiency—the more information, the better. But more public
information may instead substitute for private information, by leading mar-
ket participants to ignore or downplay their own private information in
making their decisions. Increased central bank information might even
reduce market participants’efforts to obtain information on their own. The
authors describe this as an informational externality generated by public
signals. Further, they stress that this externality can be exacerbated if agents
have an interest in the beliefs and resulting actions of others. 
To illustrate this phenomenon, they cite Keynes’s analogy of financial
markets to the newspaper “beauty contests” of his day, in which readers
won not by picking the face that they themselves thought most beautiful,
but by guessing which face would be chosen as the most beautiful by the
most other readers. As in the beauty contest, Keynes argued, an investor
buying stocks can win by anticipating which stocks will become the popu-
lar choice, which are not necessarily those of the companies with the best
fundamentals. The authors observe that in such situations the pronounce-
ments of the central bank about the economic outlook “provide a powerful
rallying point around which market expectations can coalesce,” and that
“The more market participants are concerned with the beliefs of other mar-
ket participants, the greater will be the impact of the central bank’s pro-
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believe that, however informative the central bank’s statements may be
about the fundamentals, they are even better as guides to what other agents
will think. Hence traders will give them undue weight and place less weight
on their own assessments of the fundamentals. The authors conclude that
“Public pronouncements can thus crowd out private opinions, and the mar-
ket may cease to function as a way of aggregating and revealing diverse,
private judgments about the world in the way that Hayek envisaged.” This
argument applies as well to increases in the accuracy of the central bank’s
forecasts. Improving their accuracy increases both the weight that a typi-
cal agent will place on them and his or her belief about the weight that other
agents will assign to them. It is even possible that improvement in central
bank transparency or in the accuracy of its forecasts will crowd out more
information than it adds, decreasing overall informational efﬁciency. 
It is difficult to verify empirically the importance of these considera-
tions: transparency is hard to quantify, either in levels or in changes, and it
is harder still to measure “informational efﬁciency.” But the authors report
some evidence that supports certain elements of the story. Most observers
of financial markets would agree that central bank statements about the
economy can have signiﬁcant effects on those markets, at least in the short
run, and that transparency about which economic variables the central bank
is watching increases the salience of those variables in markets. The authors
give two examples. One is George Perry’s finding, reported elsewhere in
this volume, of a much larger market response to unexpected changes in the
payroll employment survey, a series that the Federal Reserve is known to
favor, than to unexpected changes in the household employment survey,
although Perry finds that the latter has comparable information content
about the state of the economy. The other is the exaggerated reactions of
markets to announcements of the money stock aggregates after 1979, when
the Federal Reserve began to emphasize growth of the money stock as an
indicator of its monetary stance. 
On a more speculative note, the authors report several strands of evi-
dence suggesting that the increase in Federal Reserve transparency in
recent years may have been accompanied by a reduction in the information
contained in market signals. They see the recent ﬁnding by Flint Brayton,
John Roberts, and John Williams of a ﬂattening Phillips curve as suggest-
ing that goods prices have deteriorated as an indicator of how close the
economy is to capacity. And although they see increasing evidence that
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inflation expectations, the authors suggest that the flip side of “well
anchored” is “uninformative”: prices that are well anchored are also prices
that may have low signal value, revealing little about underlying shifts in
the economy. They report studies ﬁnding that surveys of inﬂation expecta-
tions in inflation targeting countries tend to be unresponsive to a moving
average of actual inﬂation, whereas such surveys report large and statisti-
cally significant responses to inflation in countries without formal infla-
tion targets. The authors also ﬁnd qualitatively similar differences between
targeting and nontargeting countries with respect to the forward inflation
premium implicit in the difference between nominal and price-indexed
bonds. But it is hard to know whether these reductions in either survey 
or market responses mean there is less information in recent inflation, 
or simply that future inflation is less related to current experience in tar-
geting countries. 
Having described why increased central bank transparency might actu-
ally reduce informational efficiency, the authors analyze some formal
models to demonstrate conditions under which this could occur. In the
simplest model, each of many agents cares how close his or her action is
to an unknown economic fundamental. (The authors normalize variables so
that it would be optimal to set the action equal to the fundamental if it
were known and the agent cared only about it.) But agents also put heavy
weight on how close their action is to their expectation of the average action
of others (in a manner analogous to the Keynesian beauty contest). If all
agents knew the true value of the fundamental and knew that other agents
also knew it, they would all set their actions equal to that value, and all
would have zero loss. But suppose each agent has only a noisy, private
signal of the fundamental, and suppose that all agents know that their
private signals are unbiased and uncorrelated across agents. In the absence
of a public signal or of sharing of information about their signals, the best
any agent can do is to set his or her action to the value of his or her signal—
the agent’s own best guess of both the true value of the fundamental and 
the actions of other agents, all of whom will be using their signals in the
same way. 
Now suppose the central bank makes public its forecast. This additional
information will affect the typical agent’s expectation of the fundamental,
making it a weighted average of the public forecast and the private signal.
Absent any concern about other agents’actions, that would also deﬁne each
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their own actions are from the action of the average agent, they will take
account of how other agents will alter their behavior. Furthermore, since
each agent expects that other agents will respond in the same way, the
response of all agents will give still more weight to the public signal than
would be warranted if each simply modiﬁed his or her expectations by the
direct information contained in the public signal. 
The results from this model illustrate the intuition gained from the
authors’earlier discussion. An increase in the precision of the public sig-
nal unambiguously increases the average distance of actions from the true
fundamental. This reﬂects the fact that the errors in the private signals aver-
age out—in the absence of the public signal, those errors might be large, but
they would sum to zero. The fact that agents weigh the public signal in
deciding their action introduces a common error in every agent’s action.
The more agents care about whether their actions are close to the average
action of others, the greater the weight they will assign to the public sig-
nal, and the further the average action will be from the true value of the
fundamental. 
The authors show that the central features of this simple beauty contest
model are present in three economic models in which information plays
an important role. In each of these models, two of which are macroeco-
nomic and one ﬁnancial, agents’actions depend on their expectations of the
average actions of others. The most familiar is the Lucas-Phelps “islands”
economy, in which islands serve as a metaphor for different regions or
sectors of the economy. Agents’supply on each island depends on their
expectations about the average of prices across all islands, and demand on
each island depends on a fundamental (the money supply) and the price
on that island. In the resulting equilibrium the price on an island depends on
expectations of the fundamental and the average price across islands in an
equation of exactly the same form as the beauty contest. The authors note,
however, that in the original version of this model the central bank has full
control over the fundamental. Michael Woodford’s model of price behavior
in a monopolistically competitive world is a second example. In this model
ﬁrms’expectations of the average prices set by other ﬁrms matter because
of price competition, and the fundamental is nominal marginal cost.
The third example is a model of ﬁnancial market prices constructed by
the authors with Franklin Allen. Models of financial prices are compli-
cated by the fact that they are forward looking—today’s price is the
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expectation today of the average expectation tomorrow, and so on, up to the
average expected fundamental. In this context public information has a dis-
proportionate effect, and the law of iterated expectations fails. In particular,
as in the simple beauty contest example, the price deviates systematically
from the average expectation of the fundamental value, being biased toward
the commonly shared information. 
In none of the models discussed so far does deterioration in the quality
of market information affect the accuracy of the central bank’s own infor-
mation. But, as the authors note, the central bank’s information comes from
the economy itself and reflects the actions taken by private agents. This
suggests the possibility that greater transparency could actually degrade the
bank’s own information. The authors show this possibility using a model in
which the underlying fundamental of the economy follows a random walk,
and the central bank’s information comes from a noisy signal of the average
of private actions in the past. This information about past private actions
is assumed to be unavailable to private agents; this simplifies the model but
is not crucial to its results. However, each private agent receives a noisy sig-
nal of the current value of the fundamental and, as in the beauty contest,
cares about both the distance of his or her action from the fundamental
and the distance from the average action of other agents. The authors show
that the precision of the central bank’s estimate of the fundamental depends
on the precision of the private signals, their own signal of past private
actions, and the variance in the innovations to the fundamental. And in
this model it is indeed the case that the central bank has more precise infor-
mation about the value of the fundamental if it does not disclose its own
estimate of that value. 
The authors are cautious in drawing strong conclusions about the wel-
fare effects of increasing transparency. It is true that they have shown how,
by making more information public, the central bank may actually reduce
the accuracy of the information available to private agents and of its own
information. But this possibility depends crucially on agents’wanting their
own actions to be close to those of others, in effect coordinating their
behavior. The authors briefly review three recent papers that explicitly
address whether increased coordination of actions increases or decreases
welfare, and find that they give varying results. Thus they conclude that the
choice of models has a pivotal effect on the conclusion. Perhaps most
important, the welfare costs of degrading the information available to the
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tral bank’s ability to stabilize the economy, a question not addressed in their
models. The authors do not see their paper as resolving whether any par-
ticular forecast or type of information should be disclosed. Rather their
objective is to point out the trade-offs involved in central bank communi-
cation with the public and to draw attention to the two-sided nature of the
debate. 
Since the mid-1990s the overall performance of the economy has sur-
passed most expectations. Unemployment fell well below levels most ana-
lysts had regarded as the economy’s natural rate, inﬂation has not emerged
as a problem, the recent recession was mild, and GDP growth has aver-
aged nearly 4 percent a year. The most striking development throughout
this period has been the rapid growth of labor productivity. After averag-
ing 1.46 percent between 1975 and 1995, the annual rise in nonfarm busi-
ness output per hour worked has averaged 2.83 percent over the past
decade. The most disappointing development has been the failure of the
median real income of workers to rise by anywhere near as much as pro-
ductivity. Such a failure can arise either from aggregate labor income fail-
ing to keep up with total output, or from increases in the inequality of
income that result in the median income rising more slowly than the mean
income. In the second article of this issue, Ian Dew-Becker and Robert
Gordon analyze both possibilities, examining how labor’s share of aggre-
gate income has varied in recent years and how the distribution of income
has dramatically changed. 
If real compensation per hour grows at the same rate as labor produc-
tivity, labor’s share of output will be unchanged. Dew-Becker and Gordon
show that, over the entire period since 1954, that is about what has
happened: economy-wide real compensation per hour rose an average of
2.1 percent a year and GDPper hour an average of 1.9 percent a year. How-
ever, over shorter intervals real compensation and output per hour have
not moved so closely, and labor’s share of income has varied more, gener-
ally rising in the initial postwar decades and declining somewhat since the
early 1980s, but with substantial shorter-run ﬂuctuations. 
Changes in labor’s share can also be inferred from the overall rise in
prices relative to total unit labor cost. Hence the effects of changes in pro-
ductivity growth on labor’s share are implicit in their effects in price and
unit labor cost equations. This leads the authors to study the impact of
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growth into Gordon’s previous model of inﬂation dynamics. This model, a
recent version of which was published in a 1998 Brookings Paper, already
included a number of explanatory variables: the gap between the actual and
the natural rate of unemployment (where the latter is free to vary over
time); long lags on the dependent variable; a number of supply-shock vari-
ables; and price control dummy variables for the Nixon years. To this list
the authors add the acceleration in labor productivity, lagged one quarter
and ﬁve quarters, and a supply-shock term for medical costs. They use this
revised model to explain changes in the personal consumption expendi-
ture deﬂator over 1962–2005 and ﬁnd that the productivity terms are jointly
significant, with faster productivity growth decreasing inflation, and that
increases in medical costs cause signiﬁcant price increases. They also show
that the equation performs better in out-of-sample simulations when these
two terms are included. 
The authors next estimate a form of their equation that includes lagged
changes in the labor share of income as an additional explanatory variable.
They use this form in regressions explaining, alternatively, inflation in
the personal consumption and nonfarm business deflators and inflation in
trend unit labor costs. The equations for the change in unit labor cost are
less satisfactory than those for price inflation, with the coefficients on pro-
ductivity acceleration still negative but not significant. However, the dif-
ferences in coefficient estimates between the unit labor cost and price
equations do imply some interesting dynamics. An acceleration in pro-
ductivity will initially lower inflation more than it reduces the growth in
unit labor costs, thus adding to the change in labor’s share. This effect van-
ishes after a year. Using a simulation of the nonfarm business deflator
and unit labor cost equations in which they suppress the productivity
deceleration of 1965–80, they show that the deceleration of productivity
added 1.3 percentage points to the average inflation rate over the period
and 2.7 percentage points by the end of the period. The effect on trend unit
labor costs was slightly larger, contributing 0.18 percentage point to the
average annual change in labor’s share. The same simulations for
1995–2000 show that the acceleration of productivity in that period low-
ered the change in labor’s share by 0.19 percentage point a year. It reduced
the annual rate of inflation by an average of 1.2 percentage points a year
over the entire period and by 1.7 percentage points a year by the end of the
period. The authors conclude that this acceleration of productivity was
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tain low interest rates in this period. 
In the second part of their paper, the authors turn to Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) data from tax returns to examine the experience of the
median worker and the distribution of income more generally. Although
labor’s share of income changed little over the decade from mid-1995 to
mid-2005, the period of surprising productivity growth, the authors show
that the experience of the median worker was sharply worse than growth
in average compensation, which determines labor’s share. 
Most studies of income inequality are based on data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). Although the CPS data have several advantages
over the IRS data for incomes up to the top decile, its income categories
provide no information about the distribution of incomes within this decile.
The IRS data, in contrast, identify incomes without an upper limit and come
from an annual sample of over 100,000 returns, with oversampling of
returns at the very top of the distribution. They thus permit a far more
revealing analysis of distribution within the top decile, which turns out to
be important for understanding recent developments. 
The authors find that the labor income distribution in their IRS data
shows the same broad trends over time as the distributions previously
reported by David Autor, Lawrence Katz, and Melissa Kearney, who used
two alternative samples of the CPS data. The main trends can be charac-
terized by the ratios of the 50th to the 10th percentile (the 50/10 ratio) and
the 90th to the 10th percentile. In all measures the 50/10 ratios were rela-
tively constant throughout the 1966–2001 period. By contrast, in all mea-
sures the 90/10 ratios rose substantially over this period, indicating that all
of the change in inequality over the period occurred above the 50th per-
centile. The bottom half of the distribution received only 12 percent of the
gain from 1966 to 2001. 
Using the IRS data, the authors are able to reﬁne these estimates, track-
ing distribution changes within the top decile where the income growth was
most concentrated. The results are striking. Over the period 1966–2001,
they find that, whereas the 90/10 ratio rose by only 34 percent, the 99/10
ratio rose by 87 percent and the 99.9/10 ratio by 185 percent, indicating an
increase in the concentration of income at ever higher quantiles. More of
the aggregate income increase went to the top 1 percent than to the bottom
50 percent, and more went to the top 0.01 percent than to the bottom 20 per-
cent. Between 1997 and 2001, the period that includes the recent produc-
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the entire sample period, except that the gains are even more concentrated
at the very top: 24 percent of the gains went to the top 1 percent, com-
pared with 13 percent to the bottom 50 percent, and twice as much went to
the top 0.01 percent as to the bottom 20 percent.
The authors estimate the increases in real average hourly compensation
in each income decile and compare them with labor productivity growth.
Over the entire 1966–2001 period, productivity growth averaged 1.57 per-
cent a year. No decile below the 90th percentile enjoyed growth in real
compensation as fast as that. But the shortfalls were greatest in the years
between 1972 and 1997. At both ends of their sample period, 1966–72 and
1997–2001, real hourly compensation exceeded productivity growth at
each income decile. For the median worker, over the entire sample period
real compensation growth averaged only 0.76 percent a year, less than half
the growth rate of productivity. And for the twenty-five years from 1972
to 1997, real compensation of the median worker declined, falling behind
productivity growth by about 1.5 percentage points a year. 
The authors conclude by examining possible causes of the changing
income distribution, informing their discussion with insights from their
analysis of IRS data. They first review the explanations of previous ana-
lysts. Skill-biased technical change, usually associated with the rise of com-
puter technology and related applications, has been commonly offered as an
explanation for widening income disparities. However, David Card and
John DiNardo, along with several subsequent authors, have rejected this
explanation, pointing out that the timing seems wrong: neither the devel-
opment of computer technology nor the slowdown in productivity corre-
lates in time with the rise in inequality. Card and DiNardo’s favored
explanation is the sharp drop in the real minimum wage in the early 1980s,
which does correspond closely in time with the sharp rise in their measure
of inequality. Autor, Katz, and Kearney concluded that demand for labor
has increasingly favored tasks associated with occupations in the top
income deciles. Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo have stressed the need to
take a long view; they explain the flattening of the income distribution
during 1930–70 as well as the growing inequality since then, identifying
three main developments that ﬁt both: the rise and fall of unionization, the
decline and recovery of immigration, and the decline and recovery in the
share of imports. 
Dew-Becker and Gordon agree with the critiques of the skill-biased
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of the alternative explanations. But they note that none of the explanations
accounts for the extraordinary increases they have identiﬁed in the top decile
of the distribution. Their own explanation attributes these changes to two
developments that might be expected to generate exceptional income gains
at the very top. The ﬁrst is the “superstar” phenomenon, ﬁrst identiﬁed by
Sherwin Rosen as an equilibrium phenomenon in unusual markets. The
second is the explosion of incomes of CEOs and other top corporate ofﬁcers. 
Superstars in the entertainment world earn huge incomes because of a
conﬂuence of factors operating in the contemporary economy. One is that
consumer preferences are highly skewed—as Rosen put it, “hearing a suc-
cession of mediocre singers does not add up to a single outstanding per-
formance.” Another is that a series of technological innovations, from
phonographs and radios to movies and television, have magnified the
potential audience and thus the revenue that can be earned by the few at
the very top. Both these factors have increased in importance in recent
decades. But are there enough superstars to matter in the aggregate? The
authors piece together evidence suggesting that there are. In 2001 the
99.99th percentile received $83 billion in income. Forbes magazine’s list of
“The Celebrity 100” accounts for $3.1 billion of that, and the total pay-
rolls of professional football, baseball, and basketball teams account for
another $7.0 billion. When one takes into account that earnings are also
highly skewed at the top in other ﬁelds, such as law and ﬁnance (although
data for these are not readily available), it is reasonable to conclude that
superstars can account for a meaningful part of aggregate income at the
very top of the distribution. 
The authors see the growing pay premiums of CEOs as a quite different
phenomenon—one not easily seen as a conventional market outcome. They
cite one study showing that the ratio of average CEO pay to average worker
pay rose from 27 to 300 between 1973 and 2000 before falling to 237 in
2001 when the stock market crashed. Other studies also show substantial
although less spectacular increases. For more recent years they cite a study
by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein showing that the compensation of
the top ﬁve executives in a sample of ﬁrms rose from 5 percent, on average,
of the ﬁrm’s total earnings to 13 percent between 1993–95 and 2000–02, an
interval of substantial growth in corporate earnings. Dew-Becker and
Gordon show that the salaries of top executives constitute a substantial
share of income at the very top of the distribution. The average pay of the
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Mid Cap 400, and the Small Cap 600 indexes was $32 million, for an aver-
age of $6.4 million each. This adds up to $48 billion, more than half of the
income in the 99.99th percentile. 
Dew-Becker and Gordon conclude that the superstar and CEO hypothe-
ses together explain much of the surge at the very top of the income distri-
bution. Furthermore, the importance of the very top has grown and now
accounts for a substantial part of the recent discrepancy between the growth
of average labor compensation and the disappointing growth in compen-
sation of the median worker. Looking ahead, the continued global spread of
entertainment technology and globalization of financial and commercial
markets could well exacerbate these trends.
The sudden and dramatic collapse of the energy trading company Enron
Corporation in the fall of 2001, ending with its bankruptcy on December 2
of that year, resulted in thousands of Enron employees losing their jobs and,
simultaneously, a substantial fraction of their retirement assets. At the end
of 2000, current and former Enron employees held 62 percent of the sav-
ings in their 401(k) retirement plans in Enron stock, which became worth-
less less than a year later. A similar fate has befallen employees of
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Polaroid, Kmart, Lucent, and Providian,
among others. Unlike deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans, 401(k) plans and other
deﬁned-contribution plans currently face no restrictions on how much of an
employee’s account may be invested in the stock of the employer. In
response to widespread public concern following these well-publicized
debacles, many bills have been introduced in Congress to regulate
employer stock holdings in 401(k) plans. But rather than place outright lim-
its on such holdings, most proposals would expand employees’rights to sell
employer stock in their account or require the employer to inform them of
the risks of concentrating their holdings. In the third paper of this issue,
James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte Madrian examine the likely
effects of such “empowerment and education” provisions. Their work
focuses on several recent natural experiments that provide evidence about
how employees utilize investment choice when given the opportunity, and
analyzes how employees respond to demonstrations of the risk of placing
all their retirement eggs in one basket. 
The natural experiments involve five large publicly held companies
where restrictions on the portfolio choices of employees were relaxed,
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company changed its rules, allowing them to diversify. The data for these
episodes come from Hewitt Associates, a large beneﬁts administration and
consulting ﬁrm, and include a series of cross sections covering all persons
employed by the ﬁrm at the time restrictions were relaxed; the information
available for each employee includes stock holdings and demographic data
such as birthdate, hire date, and compensation. 
As regulated under ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974), 401(k) plans may differ across companies in the restrictions
on ownership of company stock and in the options that must be available
to employees. If the plan is not combined with an employee stock owner-
ship plan (ESOP), the company may not require that more than 10 percent
of the employee’s own contributions be invested in the employer’s stock. 
If the plan is combined with an ESOP, this restriction does not apply.
Neither type of plan limits how much of the employer’s matching contri-
butions may be directed into employer stock. However, all assets within
an ESOPare subject to explicit diversification options. Employees with ten
years of tenure must be allowed to diversify at least 25 percent of their
employer stock holdings once they reach age ﬁfty-ﬁve and 50 percent after
reaching sixty. 
Only one of the ﬁve ﬁrms studied by the authors (the ﬁrm they designate
as company D) allowed just this minimum flexibility during the study
period, and it did so only until early 2002, when it eliminated all such
restrictions. Strikingly, however, before the minimum requirement was
lifted, the average company D employee who could have diversiﬁed never
held less than about 90 percent of his or her total portfolio in company
stock. When holdings are weighted by the size of the portfolio (that is,
simply dividing total employer stock holdings by total assets), the results
are little different, suggesting that even those employees with longer tenure
or higher salaries sought little more diversification than the average. Avery
similar pattern emerges for companies B and C, both of which allowed
greater flexibility than the law required: both simple-average and dollar-
weighted holdings of company stock by their employees seldom dipped
below 90 percent of the total. 
The authors also examine investment behavior following changes in
restrictions by companies A, D, and E. Company Avoluntarily changed its
rules in 2002, allowing employees to diversify up to 25 percent of the
employer stock in their match account at age forty-five, 50 percent at age
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stock was typically lower, the older the employee. But, on average, employ-
ees of any age never sold more than a third of the company stock they
were permitted to sell. Dollar-weighted averages fell somewhat more, indi-
cating that wealthier employees were more eager to diversify. Company
D, as noted above, eliminated all diversiﬁcation restrictions in early 2002,
but it continued to direct the employer contribution to company stock;
maintaining a diversiﬁed portfolio thus required the employee to trade out
of company stock on an ongoing basis. Company E adopted the same pol-
icy in mid-2002. The authors show that, at company D, the fraction of all
employee 401(k) balances held in company stock drifted steadily down-
ward. Yet, even after two years, 84 percent of holdings were still in com-
pany stock. Data for company E were available only for the end of 2003,
but the picture is similar: the average participant under age fifty still had
90 percent of matching balances in company stock, and that share still
exceeded 80 percent among older workers. The authors see these natural
experiments as painting a consistent picture: relaxing diversiﬁcation restric-
tions does decrease employer stock holding, but only modestly, especially
among younger employees. 
If the failure of employees to diversity their portfolios reﬂects a lack of
awareness of the dangers of placing such a large wager on their own ﬁrm’s
success, perhaps better information about those dangers is what is needed.
Six out of twenty-one 401(k) reform bills recently introduced in Congress
(listed in an appendix to the paper) take this educational approach: these
bills would require ﬁrms to inform their employees when their holdings of
company stock exceeded some percentage or, in some cases, provide infor-
mation about the desirability of diversification or the risks of concentrat-
ing their assets in company stock. But would such provisions make 
any difference? Previous studies have shown that ﬁnancial education alone
generates only small changes in 401(k) outcomes. None, however, have
investigated the effect of education by (vicarious) experience, that is, 
of witnessing the consequences of others’“financial follies.” This leads
the authors to examine how media coverage of the financial debacles of
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing affected the portfolio choices of
employees at other companies. 
The authors painstakingly construct four different proxies for daily
media coverage of the ﬁnancial collapses of these three companies, begin-
ning on October 16, 2001, the day Enron’s market capitalization fell by
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relevant newspaper stories and 1,900 television stories between October 16,
2001, and December 31, 2003. Counting only those stories that include
the term “401(k)” reduces these numbers to 761 and 144, respectively. Rec-
ognizing that the impact of one day’s stories may last several days, the
authors construct for each of these four story counts a “news impact” vari-
able that assumes that the impact decays by a constant percentage each
day after publication or broadcast. News coverage varied widely over the
period, with the most active coverage occurring from mid-December 2001
through the end of February 2002, when Enron and Global Crossing ﬁled
for bankruptcy, and again in June and July 2002, when WorldCom
disclosed major accounting irregularities and shortly thereafter filed for
bankruptcy. 
How did this news affect stock holdings in 401(k)s? For a sample of
ﬁrms whose employees held a total of approximately $45 billion in 401(k)
assets, the authors show that the share of those assets held in employer
stock began a declining trend around the time of Enron’s collapse. How-
ever, as the authors note, the overall stock market was also declining around
the same time, and indeed the share of equities held in company stock
showed much less of a downward trend. The authors ﬁnd it striking that this
share barely moved during the time that the Enron scandal was unfolding. 
The authors next investigate whether employees’net transfers are related
to the news impact variable. They first look at daily data on the value of
aggregate net transfers of employer stock (excluding payroll contributions
in company stock) as a ratio to the preceding day’s aggregate employer
stock balance. Atime-series graph of this variable indicates that the volatil-
ity of net trading increased following Enron’s collapse, but the mean direc-
tion of trades did not obviously shift in either direction. The authors run
separate regressions of this series on each of the four news impact vari-
ables, including as additional variables current and lagged market returns
on the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index, day-of-the-week dummies, and
a polynomial time trend. They ﬁnd that the news variable has a signiﬁcant
and correctly signed coefficient in all the regressions, but the coefficients
are small. Adding up the effect of all news after Enron’s collapse, they
ﬁnd that none of the speciﬁcations imply more than a 2.4-percentage-point
drop in employer stock holdings as a share of the total portfolio. The
authors recognize that some of these employer stock holdings are con-
strained, but even when calculated as a percentage of completely unre-
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6.2 percentage points. 
To further investigate the importance of holding requirements, the
authors study two large companies for which they have daily trading data.
For one of these, company D, which until 2002 set restrictions on diversi-
ﬁcation out of the employer match account, they examine only the balances
in the unrestricted employee accounts. The other company, company F,
has no diversiﬁcation restrictions anywhere in its 401(k) plan, and indeed
matching company contributions mirror whatever employees choose for
their own contributions. The analysis of data for these ﬁrms provides even
less support than the aggregate data for the hypothesis that employees
respond to bad news about other companies by reducing their investments
in company stock. Both the fraction of account balances and the fraction
of employee contributions in company stock trended upward during the
period and show little evidence of response to news. In equations testing for
a response, the regression coefficients are small, sometimes of the wrong
sign, and never signiﬁcant. 
The authors also investigate whether the Enron scandal was more salient
for workers living in Texas than elsewhere. More than a quarter of Enron’s
employees worked in Houston, and the company cut more than 4,000 jobs
at its Houston operations in 2002. Two large firms in the authors’sample
have a substantial number of employees both in and outside of Texas, mak-
ing it possible to examine what difference proximity makes to the behav-
ior of employees of the same company. It seems to make none: comparing
employees with the same date of plan enrollment, the authors ﬁnd no sig-
nificant differences in the portfolio allocations of Texan and non-Texan
employees (or, in the case of one firm, employees working in or outside 
of Houston). 
The authors conclude that empowering employees to trade out of
employer stock and educating them about the risk of employer stock will
have only a small effect on the concentration of employer stock in 401(k)
holdings. They note that this conclusion is consistent with earlier studies
showing that consumers are often passive and that educational interven-
tions yield remarkably small changes in behavior. The authors believe
their results cast doubt on the value of empowerment and education in
proposals for 401(k) reform. Most economists and financial advisers
believe in the advantages of diversiﬁcation and counsel that stock in one’s
own company should make up only a modest fraction of the typical retire-
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nalism and coercive policies. But they note that specifying a default option
would place no constraint on freedom of choice—the employee can always
override the default. The default could be a well-diversiﬁed asset allocation,
or it could simply be required to meet the same fiduciary standards that
apply to deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. The results both of this paper and of
earlier work suggest that many employees would stick with the default, and
in doing so would end up with much sounder portfolios than the typical
401(k) participant holds today. 
Energy is essential to modern economies, and as China, India, and other
poorer economies develop, world demand for energy will rise rapidly.
Growth in demand has already been one important factor driving up the
price of oil and natural gas during 2005. High prices, in turn, have encour-
aged the expansion of reserves in existing ﬁelds, the search for new ﬁelds,
and investment in unconventional sources of petroleum such as tar sands
and oil shales. Absent major political disruptions in supply, many observers
believe the world’s growing energy demand can be met from these sources
and other existing fossil-fuel-based technologies for years or decades, at
costs that are within the range of historical experience. However, there is
increasing consensus that satisfying growing demand in this way risks
severe environmental damage, and that avoiding this risk will require pol-
icy interventions and more sweeping changes in how energy is produced
and used. In the fourth article of this volume, Klaus Lackner and Jeffrey
Sachs consider these longer-term prospects and the uncertainties surround-
ing them, analyze the potential for protecting the global environment
through existing technologies and foreseeable new ones, and discuss what
the broad aims of policy for the twenty-ﬁrst century should be. 
Lackner and Sachs start with a technical overview of energy use and its
environmental impact. Fossil fuels—oil, natural gas, and coal—provide
85 percent of current U.S. and world energy use. Hydroelectric and nuclear
power provide almost all the rest. Almost all the fuel used for transportation
today comes from oil, but crude oil reserves need not limit transportation in
the future. Known technologies permit the substitution of one fossil fuel for
another. Oil shales and tar sands are already being used to produce petro-
leum. And a method known as the Fischer-Tropsch process has already
been used for several decades to convert coal into gasoline and diesel at
costs near current oil prices. Thus, although fossil fuels are, in principle,
xxvi Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005an exhaustible resource, known coal reserves are so vast that they could sat-
isfy the world’s transportation needs well beyond the present century. Bio-
mass can also be used to produce fuel for transportation, but the authors see
its quantitative potential as limited. 
Although the authors thus see no relevant limit, at least in this century, to
economic development from a possible decline of global oil and gas
resources, they do perceive a pressing environmental imperative to reduce
the world’s reliance on fossil fuels. Combustion of fossil fuels produces
carbon dioxide (CO2), the principal greenhouse gas, as a byproduct. The
capacity of the earth to absorb this CO2 is limited, although how limited is
open to debate. The problem is more complicated than public discussions
of “global warming” often suggest. As the authors explain, besides the
greenhouse effect, increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations will affect
various chemical, climatological, and biological processes on a vast scale.
Some likely consequences include major changes in winds, rainfall, and
ocean currents; rising ocean levels; the possible destruction of ocean
ecosystems; the extinction of species with limited mobility; the enhanced
transmission of diseases, such as malaria, that are now constrained by cli-
mate patterns; dislocations from changes in agricultural productivity; and
an increase in extreme weather events. They also warn that such develop-
ments may not be gradual, because feedbacks from relatively small
increases in CO2 concentrations can be large. For example, if rising tem-
peratures dislodge the ice sheets of Antarctica or Greenland, the paths of
major ocean currents could be affected; melting permafrost could release
buried methane, itself a greenhouse gas, thus adding to the total concen-
tration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
Uncertainties about the size and timing of these and other effects of
increased CO2 are large. Existing climatological models cannot adequately
explain what has already happened, let alone agree on quantitative projec-
tions under alternative paths of CO2 emissions. In 1992, when these uncer-
tainties were even greater than today, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change committed all signatories, including the
United States, to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations . . . at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.” But the United States and some other countries have since rejected
this approach. The Bush administration in particular has argued that the
costs of mitigation would exceed the beneﬁts and has rejected any speciﬁc
targets. 
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target despite the remaining quantitative uncertainties, and they summa-
rize what current knowledge suggests about reasonable target levels. There
is now widespread agreement that the continued buildup of CO2 poses
risks to the global ecosystem and to human society. The preindustrial con-
centration of CO2 in the atmosphere was 280 parts per million (ppm), and
this has already risen to 380 ppm. They report near unanimity in the scien-
tific climate community that a tripling of the preindustrial concentration,
to 840 ppm, would pose catastrophic risks and that global economic growth
over the next century is likely to raise concentrations to that level or even
higher if unfettered energy market forces are allowed to determine future
production and use. In light of this danger, the authors accept the consensus
among European governments and analysts to limit the atmospheric con-
centration of CO2 to between 450 and 560 ppm. (The latter is referred to
as the 2  standard since it is twice the preindustrial concentration.) Along
with setting a target, the authors reason that a robust policy should be
global, since global emissions are what matter, and should begin promptly
so as to minimize the present value of costs. 
Carbon emissions will inevitably continue to rise for some time, as will
the CO2 buildup in the atmosphere. But the net carbon buildup must be
reduced in the future and eventually brought down to zero if any reasonable
CO2 target level is to be maintained. The authors describe three main tech-
nologies that have the potential eventually to satisfy world energy needs
with zero carbon buildup. The first is carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS), in which the use of fossil fuels continues but the resulting carbon
emissions are captured and stored rather than released into the atmosphere.
Developing and applying CCS is the most immediate need, because it will
allow continued use of the existing energy infrastructure. The other two
technologies are nuclear and solar energy, both of which must overcome
substantial drawbacks if their role in meeting future energy needs is to
expand. 
Nuclear power today provides about 18 percent of the world’s electric-
ity, but the authors see current estimates of global uranium resources as
too small to support a greatly expanded role for conventional nuclear tech-
nology. If it can be perfected, breeder reactor technology would greatly
relax these resource limitations, but it would also increase the risk of
nuclear weapons proliferation, since the breeder process produces
weapons-grade material. Fusion energy would pose much less risk, but it
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unlimited but far too expensive with current technology. The authors regard
it as a potentially important source of energy, but only for the very distant
future. 
The authors report that CCS is already applied on a small scale in some
industries, and they discuss the costs and improvements in techniques
needed to apply it on the massive scale required to achieve net zero car-
bon growth worldwide: over a century, permanent storage would be needed
for thousands of gigatons of CO2. Options include disposal in the ocean,
storage underground, and chemical ﬁxation as a solid. The authors discuss
the pros and cons of each, including the experience to date, on a small scale,
with applications such as injection of CO2 in enhanced oil recovery. They
are skeptical about disposal in the ocean because it would not be truly per-
manent and would risk disruptive environmental changes to the ocean
itself. They conclude that carbon storage should start today with under-
ground injection and eventually move to chemical processing of CO2 into
stable solid carbonates. Injection is economically attractive today, but the
cost of chemical processing would have to fall by a factor of four or five
to keep the cost of energy within 30 percent of today’s cost. 
Capturing carbon is most economical in large fossil-fuel-using appli-
cations such as power plants. When designed into a new plant, it entails
roughly a 30 percent efﬁciency penalty. The authors also discuss potential
alternative designs that would substantially alter how power plants produce
their energy from coal. They note that carbon capture for dispersed or
mobile sources of CO2 is not a realistic option, but that there is substantial
room for reducing emissions from such sources, for example from the
adoption of low-emission vehicles and the substitution of electricity for
oil or natural gas for home heating.
The authors next turn to scenarios of future world economic growth, to
show how the production and use of energy are likely to evolve if present
patterns continue, and what the implications are for the buildup of CO2 in
the atmosphere. They then show how changes in production and use could
limit that buildup. Their scenarios are calculated from a disaggregated
model of global energy use, which divides the world into eight regions:
the United States, Western Europe, other developed economies, the transi-
tion economies, China, India, other emerging Asian economies, and all
other emerging economies. Each economy uses primary energy—oil, gas,
coal, nuclear, and renewable—directly and indirectly through the use 
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projected to grow by 1.7 percent a year, its long-term trend growth rate, and
incomes per capita in other countries are projected to converge toward the
U.S. level throughout the projection period. 
In the baseline, “business as usual” scenario, primary energy demand in
each region grows in proportion to income per capita less an efﬁciency sav-
ing of 1.5 percent a year. In each country primary energy use and electric-
ity use are assumed to grow in proportion to overall energy use. World GDP
measured in 2002 dollars grows from $46 trillion in 2002 to $278 trillion in
2050 and $910 trillion in 2100. The share of today’s developed regions in
world GDPfalls sharply, from 60 percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2050 and
21 percent in 2100. Although by 2050 efficiency gains cut energy use per
dollar of GDP by 50 percent, world demand for primary energy grows 
2.8-fold by 2050 and 4.3-fold by 2100. 
The authors estimate the effect on the global climate of this rise in
energy use, taking account of the fact that part of each year’s carbon emis-
sions will remain in the atmosphere, part will be dissolved in the ocean, and
part will be incorporated in living plants and soil, with the latter two effects
taking place gradually. They calculate that fossil-fuel-based emissions 
will rise from the current level of 5.8 gigatons of carbon (GtC) a year to
26 GtC in 2100, raising the concentration of atmospheric carbon to 
554 ppm by 2050 and to 886 ppm by 2100. They note that these projections
are highly conservative, for at least two reasons. First, declining petro-
leum reserves will likely lead to substitution of coal and other fossil fuels;
this would raise carbon emissions above the baseline because these fuels
emit more carbon per unit of energy than does petroleum. Second, if the
developing world’s use of automobiles grows faster than its GDP, as it
almost certainly will, its energy demand will rise much faster than in the
baseline projection. 
Lackner and Sachs’alternative scenario considers what they see as the
best way to avoid the unacceptable business-as-usual outcomes. For the
immediate future, it involves two main initiatives that are immediately
available: sharply improving efficiency in transportation by embracing
hybrid technology in automobiles, and introducing CCS technologies in
facilities where coal is used on a large scale. Although the authors project
that hybrid vehicles could double fuel efﬁciency—a much greater improve-
ment than present hybrid models can provide—making their adoption cost
effective to consumers, they nonetheless argue for subsidizing hybrid auto-
xxx Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2005mobiles in order to achieve their full potential to reduce carbon emissions.
In their alternative scenario, and with their projected gains in fuel effi-
ciency, converting entirely to hybrid cars would reduce CO2 concentrations
in 2050 by 4 percent from the baseline. As for CCS, although its application
is in its infancy, the technologies themselves are known and ready to be
exploited. The authors calculate that the total costs, including capital costs,
of CCS in power generation are in the range of 1 to 3 cents per kilowatt-
hour. In their alternative scenario, by 2050 the full implementation of CCS
would cost somewhere between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of world GDP but
would reduce CO2 emissions by an estimated 17 Gt a year. If CCS were
phased in starting in 2006, the atmospheric concentration of CO2 in 2050
would be reduced by about 8 percent. The authors emphasize that initiatives
in both hybrid transportation technology and CCS should be taken without
delay. Waiting allows emissions to continue rising, invites continued con-
struction of long-lived non-CCS plants, and postpones the learning and cost
reductions that will surely come once better technologies are actively
pursued. 
Although these ﬁrst steps would slow the trajectory of CO2 buildup, they
would not keep it from eventually rising to dangerous levels. For the sec-
ond half of the century, therefore, further improvements will be needed.
These will have to come from reducing point-source emissions—those
from cars, homes, or businesses that are too small to use CCS. Much more
widespread electrification or the development of other noncarbon energy
carriers, such as hydrogen, could eliminate point-source emissions if tech-
nology can make them cost effective over this more distant horizon. 
The authors emphasize that growth in the developing world will be the
main driver in carbon buildup. In their base case, the developing countries
account for almost 60 percent of emissions in 2025 and 70 percent in 2050.
China and India are the countries where the greatest increase in energy con-
sumption will take place and therefore where most new power generating
facilities will be built. And it is much less expensive to reduce emissions by
building new facilities with the new technology than by retrofitting old
ones. Thus any successful program to reduce carbon emissions will have
to center on these and other countries in the developing world. The authors
note that either a uniform tax on carbon emissions in all regions or a system
of global tradable permits—both of which have been proposed—could, in
principle, provide the needed incentives to restrain emissions. However,
they recognize that negotiations to do either may be difficult, and they
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cooperation of the limited number of decisionmakers who license new
power plants and set new efﬁciency standards. Whatever route is taken to
achieve global cooperation, since most of the carbon reduction will have
to be done in regions that can least afford the added cost, the authors stress
that part of the incremental cost of CCS in China, India, and other devel-
oping nations should be borne by the high-income countries. 
The monthly employment report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) is the government’s most widely anticipated statistical report. It
includes the most current information available on labor market develop-
ments from two sources, a survey of households and a survey of payrolls,
and so offers the earliest and broadest picture of how the overall economy
is performing. The household survey, based on monthly responses from
about 60,000 households, measures the total number of people employed
and unemployed and provides a wealth of more detailed information, much
of it disaggregated by demographic characteristics. The payroll survey,
based on monthly reports from about 400,000 business establishments (and
revised annually on the basis of more complete information), measures
the total number of nonfarm jobs, hours worked, and average hourly earn-
ings, all disaggregated by industry. Each survey thus provides a measure
of overall monthly employment growth. The two measures often differ by
a substantial amount, and the measure from the payroll data is widely
regarded as the more reliable. It is featured on the front page of the BLS’s
monthly release and in press and television coverage, and Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan has publicly stated his preference for it. In the
last paper in this volume, George Perry questions whether this overwhelm-
ing preference for the payroll estimate of aggregate employment is war-
ranted and concludes it is not. 
Perry starts by looking for evidence that policymakers and markets in
fact respond to the payroll data and ignore the household data. He first
analyzes how Treasury yields respond to the two measures of monthly
employment change, using regressions of changes in market yields of Trea-
sury securities from just before to shortly (either twenty-five minutes or
twenty-four hours) after the employment release on the surprise in the
employment change from each survey. The “surprise” is taken as the dif-
ference between the actual change and the expected change as reported in
surveys of analysts; separate regressions are performed for Treasurys with
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data are clearly favored: they have substantial explanatory power in most
speciﬁcations, including those that use the household data and changes in
unemployment as additional explanatory variables. The household data, in
contrast, explain little of the variation in yields, even when they are the only
explanatory variable, and they contribute nothing when entered together
with the payroll data. 
To examine which employment measure monetary policymakers respond
to, Perry performs regressions that explain changes in the federal funds
rate, the Federal Reserve’s principal policy instrument, by changes in the
two employment measures between meetings of the Federal Open Market
Committee. In all specifications—those using each employment measure
alone, both measures together, and both measures together with the inflation
rate and changes in the unemployment rate—the payroll data again domi-
nate not only the household data but all the other variables as well. In regres-
sions that do not include the unemployment rate, the household employment
data are signiﬁcant, although much less important than the payroll data. 
Having established that markets and policymakers indeed focus over-
whelmingly on the payroll rather than the household employment data as an
indicator of how the economy is performing, Perry turns to whether this
focus is justiﬁed. There are a number of deﬁnitional differences between the
two series, the main ones being the omission of agricultural workers and the
self-employed from the payroll data and the counting of multiple job hold-
ers only once in the household data. He notes that the estimated sampling
error of the payroll data is much smaller but that other sources of error
may not be. Reviewing a number of nonsampling problems inherent in the
two series, he reasons that the biggest problem may arise in the payroll
series’need to account for the birth and death of business establishments.
Over 300,000 new establishments are formed each quarter, and account-
ing for them and allocating their employment, as well as employment losses
in establishments that close, poses an especially difﬁcult problem for esti-
mating monthly changes in payroll employment. Perry concludes that the
known characteristics of the two series give no decisive reason for consid-
ering one more reliable than the other, and he therefore turns to statistical
tests. For this purpose he ﬁrst compares the two series for the period begin-
ning in 1994; the methodology used in the household survey was substan-
tially improved in that year, presumably making this period the most
relevant for assessing the series’usefulness now and in the future. 
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in the cyclical performance of the economy, Perry ﬁrst examines how well
each measure of employment change tracks contemporaneous changes in
output and unemployment, the other two main cyclical variables. He notes
that other potential candidates for cyclical tracking tests, such as industrial
production or help wanted advertising, are themselves partly derived from
the payroll data or refer only to payroll jobs, making them useless for com-
paring the two employment series. He reasons that, although unemploy-
ment is measured from the household survey, regression bias from response
error should be minimal since the main response error is between the cate-
gories “unemployed” and “out of the labor force.” 
Data on GDPand private nonfarm business output, the main measures of
aggregate performance, are available quarterly, and so Perry’s ﬁrst tests use
quarterly averages of employment change. The household data explain sub-
stantially more of the variation in either output measure than do the pay-
roll data as initially reported. They also outperform the payroll data after the
annual revision of the latter, although by less. When entered together with
the revised payroll data, the household series has the larger coefficient.
Perry also tries an alternative “research” series, constructed by the BLS,
that adjusts the household data to payroll concepts. The household series
outperforms this measure, too, suggesting that ﬂuctuations in self-employ-
ment are important in tracking output. For the regressions tracking changes
in unemployment, monthly data are available. Again the household data
outperform the payroll data as originally reported, and they do about as well
as the payroll data after their annual revision. Quarterly unemployment
regressions give parallel results. As in the regressions tracking output, the
household data also outperform the research series. 
As a further test, Perry estimates simple aggregate employment func-
tions in which current and lagged changes in output, together with devia-
tions in average hours worked from their trend, are used to explain changes
in payroll and household employment. In these regressions the household
data are better explained when only current and once-lagged changes in
output are used, whereas the payroll data are better explained when two
additional lags of output are used. 
Taken collectively, these results for the period since 1994 provide no
support for the widespread belief that the household data should be disre-
garded in favor of the payroll data as a measure of quarterly or monthly
changes in aggregate employment. Repeating the regressions for each of
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ever. For the two earliest intervals, the decades beginning in 1954 and 1964,
the payroll data clearly dominate in all tests. But for the two more recent
decades, beginning in 1974 and 1984, the results are mixed, with some
speciﬁcations and periods favoring one and some the other. Perry notes that
the dominance of the payroll series for the earliest decades is consistent
with the idea that users came to prefer it then because it correlated best with
other indicators of economic performance and never seriously reexamined
that choice, influenced perhaps by the household series’larger statistical
standard error and its larger monthly volatility. 
The empirical evidence for recent decades suggests that averaging
monthly changes in the payroll and household data may be the optimal
strategy. Perry shows that the monthly volatility of this averaged series is as
low as the volatility of the payroll data alone and substantially lower than
that of the household data. He examines the performance of the averaged
data in tracking equations for the period since 1994. In tracking output,
the average formed with payroll data as initially reported does nearly as
well as the household data alone, and better than the payroll data alone. The
average formed with annually revised payroll data outperforms even the
household data alone. The improvements are even stronger in equations
tracking unemployment. Here the average employment change, using either
revised or unrevised payroll data, dominates either the household or the
payroll data alone in both monthly and quarterly regressions. 
Perry concludes that users should average the reported changes from
the two data sources to get the most useful characterization of monthly
and quarterly employment growth. He acknowledges that the BLS cannot
report this average as its ofﬁcial estimate of employment growth, because
of the definitional differences in what the two series measure. However,
he suggests that the BLS give the two measures of employment change
equal prominence in its monthly press release. 
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